Another interesting and rewarding philosophical post from Laura Cooper here on a masterpiece of 20th century philosophy - A. J. "Freddy" Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic
. For those of you unfamiliar with it, this excellent Wikipedia entry should help. Ayer wrote his most famous work in his early twenties and it continues to stimulate young thinkers today...I was expecting something slightly different from A.J. Ayer when I started reading
Language, Truth and Logic. It was once both easy and fun for me to rashly accuse all linguistic analysts of taking the easy way out – “A word, if it refers to something that is not empirically definable, is unusable”. But Ayer makes a more cohesive explanation for his rejection of metaphysics, which I will present in five points. Keep in mind that Chapter 1 (The Elimination of Metaphysics) is dedicated not to disproving the facts previous philosophers have set forth in favour of a metaphysical realm, but to disproving the belief that their statements could have any
factual significance:
1. “A statement is factually significant iff [‘iff’ is philosophical shorthand for ‘if and only if’] he knows how to verify the proposition which it purports to express—that is, if he knows what observations would lead him, under certain conditions, to accept the proposition as being true, or reject it as being false. If, on the other hand, the putative proposition is of such a character that the assumption of its truth, or falsehood, is consistent with any assumption whatsoever concerning the nature of his future experience, then, as far as he is concerned, it is, if not a tautology, a mere pseudo-proposition.”
2. A distinction must be made between “practical verifiability” and “verifiability in principle”. Many propositions have been made which could have been
conceivably proven, but for some reason or another, the right conditions were not in place, making the arrangement of all possible variables impossible. However, this does not disprove the significance of the proposition because it is theoretically conceivable. This is in direct opposition to those propositions made which have no probability one way or the other, or would remain equally unprovable under
all conditions. Therefore, we cannot count on a series of observations to conclusively support or confute our position, lest we be barred from the ability to make any kinds of purposeful statements at all.
3. The question we must ask of putative statements is simply: “Would any observations be relevant to the determination of its truth or falsehood?” Ayer seems to add a new portion to his principle of verifiability rather than elaborating on it here, as he goes on to explain the example that “sense-experience is altogether unreal” cannot be sensible because although there is evidence against the claim, there can be no verifiable evidence
for it (think Kant here; as Ayer goes on to use the same example against the debate of realism versus idealism). He gives us the fact that we “rely on our senses to substantiate or confute the judgments which are based on our sensations” as his own evidence for the side of “sense-experience is real”. The reason I say that it seems like he is adding a new feature to his previous argument is that it seems to no longer take into account the sole criterion of the
consistency of conditions in evaluating factual significance. Instead, he is stating that in order for a statement to be significant, it must have shown supporting evidence one way or another. Let’s look at his original proposition again:
“…if he knows what observations would lead him, under certain conditions, to accept the proposition as being true, or reject it as being false. If [the assumption of a proposition's truth or falsehood] is consistent with any assumption whatsoever concerning the nature of his future experience, then it is…a mere pseudo-proposition.”
Although the question he proposes seems to align with his original, the examples do not. I interpret the propositions to state that a statement may contain factual significance to a given person if he can conceive of conditions in which it may theoretically exist, and conditions in which it may not. If there is a factual statement made in which it holds true regardless under any conditions, it is nonsensical and false. This seems to me to be a much more interesting proposition than “a statement contains no significance if there is no empirical evidence for it (and is therefore irrelevant)”, which is exactly the sort of statement for which I had been so ready to scorn pragmatism and other linguistically analytic philosophies.
4. Ayer makes an interesting reformulation of the preceding question, which is that a statement has factual significance if experiential propositions can be derived from it in conjunction with certain other premises
without being deduced by those other premises alone. This actually seems to be the example he uses to argue against the idea that “sense-experience is altogether unreal”, since he can use a fact-statement (“Sense-experience is real”) in conjunction with the idea that we use our sense-experience to evaluate judgments previously made with our sense-experience. This, to Ayer, now allows his argument more weight than “sense-experience is unreal” is allowed, for the latter argument really has no empirical evidence in its court. This, again, is dependent on previous propositions and experiential evidence, rather than the consistency of conditions.
5. [Therefore] because metaphysical conclusions are neither tautologies nor empirical sense-data, they are nonsensical.
"So, how do metaphysical mistakes come to be made?"
The use of the term “substance” is to blame. Those who make the mistake of arguing that the metaphysical realm is indeed logical do so simply because they have been “infected by the primitive superstition” that by naming a thing, a corresponding “substance” of it must exist. Ayer states that we are wrong in our compulsion to think of things having a separate existence apart from its appearances, and doing so is just a result from an “accident of linguistic usage”. What makes these things’ appearances is not the corresponding entity of each, but of their relationship to one another. A way to prove this can be done using an example from Immanuel “Existence Is Not An Attribute” Kant. Take the following statements:
1) Martyrs suffer
2) Martyrs exist
Because they are grammatically similar, the mistake could easily be made to assume that they are sentences of the same type. However, the reason “existence is not an attribute” is that in order to attribute something to the subject, we already
assume that it exists. Because martyrs suffer, we assume that they must exist in order to suffer. If “existence” is then included within the subject (for without existence, there would be no subject), the sentence becomes “A = A”, and adds nothing to the subject. Then, all positive statements of existence (A = A) become tautologies and all negative statements (A = ~A) of existence become illogical. The only way this can be overcome, as Kant states, is by discarding the original subject. Take another of Ayer’s examples:
1) Dogs are faithful.
2) Unicorns are fictitious.
We see here the same grammatical resemblance, but because dogs must exist in order to be faithful, can it also be held that unicorns must exist in order to be fictitious? Unless, as Ayer says, there is a way that unicorns may exist and still be fictitious, this sentence is illogical. However, since there is no way to prove that there is some non-empirical way that unicorns may be fictitious and still exist, the statement that unicorns exist non-empirically and separately is nonsensical. Metaphysical errors, according to Ayer, come not from errors of fact, but in errors of linguistic presentation.
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