Refuting Common Sense & Pascal's Wager

This essay was written by Eric Stockhausen. Eric is an 18 year-old freethinker from Texas. In this essay he tries to refute both the author Steven E. Landsburg and his believing brother who offered him 'common sense' arguments for God's existence.

I have heard arguments for belief that range from ‘common sense’ to usefulness. The common sense argument generally aim at how it is ‘impossible’ for a god (and they mean God) not to exist. Anyone who studied the history of science knows that nature goes against common sense. Two examples that spring to mind include heliocentricity and quantum mechanics.

There may be many things human minds may not be able to conceive, which is why I dislike mathematics being used to heavily in theories for or against a god. Steven E. Landsburg, writer of The Big Questions, uses his understanding of mathematics to prove that both intelligent design and Richard Dawkins are both using flawed arguments. The problem is he evokes Euclidian geometry and ‘conceivable’ mathematics. The universe has ‘inconceivable geometry’. The evidence for general relativity on the macro-level has shown that we do not exist in the simplistic three dimensions of Euclid. The problem of looking at the universe in a traditional mathematics approach is that one does not realize that nature is very different to our expectations.

To be fair, Landsberg’s arguments do not rest on top of Euclidian geometry; but on principles I believe many atheists may agree with; like mathematics in totality is very complex. Anyone who has studied calculus and trigonometry know the way mathematics works is very complex in the sense of proofs and mathematical relationships. I would not agree with Richard Dawkins, if he had believed that it was philosophically impossible for there to be an intelligent designer. I have heard Richard Dawkins use qualifiers forming the distinction between philosophical knowledge and empirical knowledge. For instance, philosophically, I do not know if the universe was created five minutes ago. Richard Dawkins, on principle, does not believe it like most people.

Landsburg ends his argument against Richard Dawkins’ atheism with the problematic Pascal’s Wager. Basically, it argues that the possible benefits of belief justify belief. On the same logic, the belief that (A) believing in unicorns will give me (B) fifty million dollars is justified (he actually states fifty million dollars would justify a wager for a Nigerian scam in a footnote). One problem is that anyone can replace A and B with whatever they want, even believing with disbelieving. Another is that most people would not believe in unicorns just because I said there would be a benefit in it for them. What I think is most telling about this is that it makes the mistake of confusing genuine belief with a gamble. A person cannot believe with Pascal’s Wager but only assert that they believe. The person claims to believe not because they do but because it is beneficial. Belief is an intelligent decision based on the best of one’s knowledge. If a person really thinks he or she believes in a god because of Pascal’s Wager, they are deluding themselves. Even Landsburg admits that it is very unlikely that God exists.

In conclusion, common sense can be wrong and cannot prove god’s existence; Pascal’s Wager is only seems useful to the faithful in its narrow interpretation but it has a whole world of philosophical problems.

The views expressed in this post are those of the author and don't necessarily reflect the views of Young Freethought's editors.